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Abstract
Social Security disability claims are not supposed to be decided based
on the gender of the applicant. Reliance on the apparently neutral
mechanism of clinical medical evidence, however, has a disproportionate
impact on women bringing disability claims based on fibromyalgia.
Recognizing and identifying disability has been delegated by Congress and
the Social Security Administration almost entirely to physicians, based
upon the misguided belief that clinical medical evidence evaluated by a
physician will answer with certainty whether an individual claimant is
capable of working. Fibromyalgia, a diffuse syndrome characterized by
excessive pain that is overwhelmingly diagnosed in women rather than
men, is not easily shown with clinical evidence. The disabling aspect of
fibromyalgia is widespread and prolonged pain, supported only by a
patient's subjective reports. Even the diagnosis depends on whether a
patient describes pain at specific points on her body. Fibromyalgia claims
thus provide a case study for evaluating the effectiveness and objectivity of
the disability evaluation process. This article explains why the Social
Security Administration relies so heavily on clinical medical evidence,
traces the history of excess pain claims and why they are so difficult to
evaluate, and explains why the current standards disproportionately
disadvantage female fibromyalgia claimants.
INTRODUCTION
In the 1950s, Congress created Social Security disability benefits as a
wide-reaching safety net for Americans who were unable to support
themselves due to disability.' As of December 2002, about 5.5 million
Americans were receiving Social Security disability benefits.2
A significant number of Social Security recipients suffer from
fibromyalgia, a diffuse syndrome primarily characterized by severe pain.
Although the identification of fibromyalgia as a distinct syndrome is a
recent phenomenon, fibromyalgia has not only become a familiar term to
most Americans, 3 but has also become an increasing source of Social
Security disability claims.4 For example, in one survey of Social Security
1. History: Vote Tallies of the 1956 Amendments, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE (last
visited Sept. 24, 201 t), http://www.ssa.gov/history/tally56.html.
2. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 108TH CONG., 2004 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND
MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS 3-35 (Comm. Print 2004) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK].
3. For example, the cover of Time Magazine dated March 2, 2011 was titled
"Understanding Pain," and the issue featured a series of articles discussing chronic pain
conditions such as fibromyalgia.
4. Frederick Wolfe et al., Work and Disability Status of Persons with Fibromyalgia,
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recipients near Wichita, Kansas, fibromyalgia was the source of forty-six
percent of disability awards.'
The process of evaluating disability for the purposes of Social
Security benefits, however, seems ill-equipped to grapple with
fibromyalgia. Fibromyalgia is an unusual syndrome in that it is not a
physical injury or trauma, nor is it a disease that can be identified by a
clinical test yielding a yes or no answer. As a result, people suffering from
fibromyalgia face considerable challenges in navigating the Social Security
6
process.
Fibromyalgia is an unusual syndrome for another reason: it
overwhelmingly affects women more often than men. In practical effect,
therefore, fibromyalgia patients struggling to make disability claims are
women. Moreover, these gendered disability claims are evaluated by a
system that is already known to have a disparate effect according to the
gender of the claimant. In 1992, the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force
surveyed representatives of Social Security claimants to assess whether the
evaluation process was gendered. Only thirty-nine percent of male
representatives believed that the gender of a claimant affected the opinion
of the medical experts evaluating his or her claim.8 Similarly, every male
administrative law judge (ALJ) surveyed stated that gender played no role
in making a determination of disability.9
By contrast, ninety-eight percent of female representatives believed
that the gender of a claimant affected the opinion of medical experts.'o
Female ALJs also said that many ALJs are biased as to the gender of
claimants appearing before them. 1 Many scholars looking at the problems
of women within the Social Security system blame this on bias on the part
of ALJs tasked with evaluating the credibility of female claimants.12
It is the contention of this article that this does not tell the whole story.
24 J. RHEUMATOLOGY 1206 (1997) (conducting a study on the incidence of disability
payments and concluding that it rose from 25% to 44.6% after 1988).
5. Jerome Groopman, Hurting All Over, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 13, 2000, at 78; see
also Wolfe et al., supra note 4.
6. See generally Aimde E. Bierman, Note, The Medico-Legal Enigma of
Fibromyalgia: Social Security Disability Determinations and Subjective Complaints of
Pain, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 259 (1998).
7. NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, UNITED STATES COURTS, THE PRELIMINARY REPORT OF
THE NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, DECISION DRAFT 97 (1992).
8. Linda G. Mills, Recent Development, A Calculus for Bias: How Malingering
Females and Dependent Housewives Fare in the Social Security Disability System, 16
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 211, 221 (1993).
9. Id at 229.
10. Id at 221.
I1. Id. at 229.
12. See, e.g., Elaine Golin, Note, Solving the Problem of Gender and Racial Bias in
Administrative Adjudication, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1532, 1533 (1995); Mills, supra note 8.
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Determinations of disability for the purpose of granting or denying Social
Security benefits rest on a particular definition of disability as a clinically
determinable state." Congress and the Social Security Administration
(SSA) have delegated recognizing and identifying disabilities almost
entirely to physicians, based upon a misguided belief that clinical medical
evidence evaluated by a trained physician will answer with certainty
whether an individual claimant is capable of working. Although the SSA
and ALJs eventually make a final judgment of disability, physicians play a
"critical gatekeeping role" in disability determinations, purportedly making
the determination process objective.14 This places physicians in a peculiar
and inappropriate role, wherein they are required to be decision makers in
law as well as medicine, and called upon to make legal decisions in a
context-the doctor's office-that is designed for a very different purpose.
Certain types of disability claims and types of claimants, however, are
disproportionately affected by this focus on clinical medical evidence.
Fibromyalgia provides a helpful case study to evaluate and identify such
claims. Examination of fact-specific circumstances is useful for evaluating
whether the apparently neutral process of medical review generates truly
neutral results, and surveying the fact-specific circumstances of
fibromyalgia claims is an excellent test for the SSA's process in this regard.
This article begins in Part I with an analysis of fibromyalgia as a
disease and as a disability, and explains why people suffering from
fibromyalgia cannot provide clinical medical evidence proving the severity
of their symptoms. It then evaluates the interaction between fibromyalgia
and the SSA's supposedly neutral evaluation process, first turning in Part II
to the Social Security Administration itself to explain the history of its
reliance upon physicians to determine disability and how the evaluation
process continues to defer to medical evidence and judgment. Part III
focuses on the history of excess pain cases, characterized by claimants who
13. Although the government grapples with the definition of disability in other contexts,
notably the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), defining and identifying "disability"
began with and remains most common in the context of Social Security. Deirdre M. Smith,
Who Says You're Disabled? The Role of Medical Evidence in the ADA Definition of
Disability, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1, 47 (2007). Additionally, the ADA is an antidiscrimination
rather than a social welfare statute, and thus takes a different analytic approach to the
definition of disability-an approach that some criticize as having "failed to achieve
significant improvements in employment for people with disabilities." Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.L 1, 6 (2004). Similarly, other
commentators have focused on the difficulty of bringing a successful worker's
compensation claim based on fibromyalgia, which uses a third and different approach. See
Gen6 Stephens Connolly, Hidden Illness, Chronic Pain: The Problems of Treatment and
Recognition of Fibromyalgia in the Medical Community, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 112
(2002).
14. Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as Legal Construct, 50
HASTINGs L.J. 241, 282 (1999).
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argue that their symptoms, rather than underlying disease or impairment
alone, are the cause of their disability. Such cases, exemplified by
fibromyalgia, have been the source of considerable difficulty for the SSA
and courts. Part IV explains why the current standard for excess pain
claims still fails to accurately and fairly assess fibromyalgia as a disability.
Finally, Part V offers recommendations on how to better evaluate
fibromyalgia claims, and what larger lessons can be drawn from
fibromyalgia's example.
I. FIBROMYALGIA
Fibromyalgia is unlike most causes of disability in that it is neither a
traumatic injury nor a disease. Rather, fibromyalgia is a syndrome, defined
as "a form of chronic neuromuscular pain that meets statistically validated
criteria."' 5 A form of rheumatism in the soft tissues,' 6 fibromyalgia is the
second most common disorder seen by rheumatologists.' 7  While only
about two percent of the population has fibromyalgia,'" diagnoses are
strikingly gendered, with females making up between eighty and ninety
percent of fibromyalgia sufferers.' 9
It is unclear how long the syndrome now described as fibromyalgia
has been in existence. Tender points on the spine that are similar to some
of the diagnostic criteria used today were first reported by a British
physician in 1821,20 but fibromyalgia was not identified as a distinct
syndrome within the broader label of soft tissue rheumatism until the
twentieth century. A more generic term, fibrositis, developed at the turn of
the century to describe "diffuse aches and pains." 21 Symptoms specific to
what we now call fibromyalgia were first documented in Germany in
15. DANIEL J. WALLACE & JANICE BROCK WALLACE, ALL ABOUT FIBROMYALGIA: A
GUIDE FOR PATIENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 13 (2002) (emphasis omitted).
16. Id at 9.
17. James A. Inman & Sandra L. Inman, Fibromyalgia and the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Overcoming Hurdles for Successful Litigation, 13 MICH. ST. J. MED. & L.
39, 41 (2009).
18. John McBeth, The Epidemiology of Chronic Widespread Pain and Fibromyalgia, in
FIBROMYALGIA & OTHER CENTRAL PAIN SYNDROMES 17, 17-18 (Daniel J. Wallace & Daniel
J. Clauw eds., 2005).
19. See Michael Finch, Law and the Problem of Pain, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 285, 289 n.23
(2005); Ruby Afram, Note, New Diagnoses and the ADA: A Case Study of Fibromyalgia
and Multiple Chemical Sensitivity, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 85, 93 (2004)
(noting that women are ten times more likely than men to be diagnosed with fibromyalgia).
See also McBeth, supra note 18, at 18 (estimating that 34 of 1,000 women suffer from
fibromyalgia, versus 5 of 1,000 men).
20. Daniel J. Wallace, The History of Fibromyalgia, in FIBROMYALGIA & OTHER
CENTRAL PAIN SYNDROMES, supra note 18, at 1, 2.
21. EDWARD SHORTER, FROM PARALYSIS TO FATIGUE: A HISTORY OF PSYCHOSOMATIC
ILLNESS IN THE MODERN ERA 312 (1992).
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1843,22 but the label "fibromyalgia" was not applied to those symptoms
until 1976.23
A patient with fibromyalgia generally complains of pain all over the
body. Other common symptoms include stiffness, particularly in the joints,
feelings of numbness or tingling, fatigue, and difficulty sleeping.24
Because these symptoms are also associated with many other disorders,
fibromyalgia is often a "diagnosis of exclusion," made after other disorders
are ruled out.25
The American College of Rheumatology first published its diagnostic
criteria for fibromyalgia in 1990.26 A patient who has suffered from
chronic and widespread pain is examined by his or her doctor, who applies
pressure to specific "tender points" on the body. Fibromyalgia is
diagnosed if the patient reports "excessive tenderness" in at least eleven of
the eighteen tender points.27 Obviously, because the diagnosis is made
purely on the basis of a patient's self-reported, subjective experience of
pain, it could be argued that patients could easily fake symptoms in order to
be diagnosed-although, as at least one court has pointed out, it would
require, at minimum, researching and memorizing the eighteen tender
points.28 On the other hand, some physicians have criticized the tender
22. Amanda L. Van, Note, Intolerable Uncertainty: An Examination of the Inconsistent
Treatment of Fibromyalgia Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 27 T. JEFFERSON L.
REv. 421, 426 (2005).
23. Afram, supra note 19, at 94.
24. Muhammad B. Yunus, Symptoms and Signs of Fibromyalgia Syndrome: An
Overview, in FIBROMYALGIA & OTHER CENTRAL PAIN SYNDROMES, supra note 18, at 125,
125-27.
25. WALLACE & WALLACE, supra note 15, at 103.
26. Inman & Inman, supra note 17, at 41-42.
27. Id.
28. Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 306-07 (7th Cir. 1996) (opinion for court by
Posner). Noting that the symptoms are "easy to fake" is not to say that Posner was
unsympathetic either to the individual plaintiff or skeptical of fibromyalgia in general-
although he notes that fibromyalgia impacts only a minority of sufferers such that they
cannot work, the court reversed the ALJ's denial of benefits in this case. Judge Diane Wood
later described Posner's opinion in Sarchet by saying that "[n]o one could doubt from this
passage or from the rest of the opinion that this woman's medical condition received
nothing but the most careful attention from the author of the opinion." Hon. Diane P.
Wood, Health, Heart, and Mind: The Contributions of Richard A. Posner to Health Law
and Policy, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y ix, xv (2000). Furthermore, in a later case
also involving fibromyalgia, Posner articulated a robust defense of somatization versus
malingering:
Pain is always subjective in the sense of being experienced in the brain. The
question whether the experience is more acute because of a psychiatric
condition is different from the question whether the applicant is pretending to
experience pain, or more pain than she actually feels. The pain is genuine in the
first, the psychiatric case, though fabricated in the second. The cases involving
somatization recognize this distinction.
90 Vol. 2 1:1
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points diagnosis as too narrow, on the grounds that fibromyalgia is
characterized by pain all over the body-almost any point on the body
could be labeled a "tender point." 29
The cause of fibromyalgia is currently unknown. Various theories
have been considered by medical researchers, including a viral cause akin
to the Epstein-Barr virus. 30  In the 1980s, many doctors believed that
fibromyalgia was triggered by a traumatic event such as whiplash, and used
the term "post-traumatic fibromyalgia syndrome," but that theory and term
are not in common usage today.31 Current research indicates that
fibromyalgia patients may process pain differently than unaffected people.
Some studies indicate that people with fibromyalgia have a higher level of
chemicals that help amplify and transmit pain signals in their spinal fluid,
and that they may have lower levels of serotonin, which helps to regulate
those pain signals.32 Lyrica, the first drug approved by the FDA for the
treatment of fibromyalgia, was initially developed to treat epilepsy by
regulating electrical signals in the brain, but was discovered to ease
fibromyalgia symptoms in some people, apparently because the drug
regulates the signals causing chronic pain as well.33 This state of flux in
the medical understanding of fibromyalgia means that physicians called
upon to evaluate the severity of an individual patient's condition assess
fibromyalgia from very different standpoints, depending on where they
stand in the evolving clinical understanding of fibromyalgia. 34
Whatever the cause of fibromyalgia, the vast majority of people with
fibromyalgia are not disabled by the condition. Thirty percent of
fibromyalgia patients are homemakers or retired, and sixty percent work
full time.35 Only ten percent are disabled, wholly or partly, by their
condition. 36
Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 2004).
29. ANDREW MALLESON, WHIPLASH AND OTHER USEFUL ILLNESSES 169-70 (2002).
30. Nat'l Inst. of Arthritis & Muscoloskeletal & Skin Diseases, Fibromyalgia Research:
Challenges and Opportunities, COUNSELLING [sic] RESOURCES EXTRAS (last visited Sept. 24,
2011), http://crextras.com/lib/articles/distress/chronic/fibromyalgia/fibromyalgia-research/.
31. MALLESON, supra note 29, at 166.
32. Joel Everest, Note, Fibromyalgia and Workers' Compensation: Controversy,
Problems, and Injustice, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1031, 1033-34 (2009).
33. Id. at 1036. See also Charles H. Bombadier & Dedra Buchwald, Chronic Fatigue,
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, and Fibromyalgia: Disability and Health-Care Use, 34 MED.
CARE 924, 929 (1996) (noting that fifteen percent of more than 550 clinic patients with
fibromyalgia and/or chronic fatigue surveyed self-reported social security disability
benefits).
34. Frederick Wolfe, Fibromyalgia: On Diagnoses and Certainty, in
MUSCULOSKELETAL PAIN, MYOFASCIAL PAIN SYNDROME, AND THE FIBROMYALGIA
SYNDROME 17, 17 (Soren Jacobson et al. eds., 1992).
35. Daniel J. Wallace, The Economic Impact of Fibromyalgia on Society and Disability
Issues, in FIBROMYALGIA & OTHER CENTRAL PAIN SYNDROMES, supra note 18, at 395, 396.
36. Id.
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Finally, as with many syndromes without clear cause, there are many
people, including physicians, who doubt that fibromyalgia actually exists.
Even some physicians involved in the identification of fibromyalgia are
now skeptical that it is a "real" disorder. Some believe that fibromyalgia
patients exaggerate what are for other people quite normal levels of pain.
For example, the physiatrist Chan Gunn stated that "fibromyalgia merely
describes the most extreme and extensive of mundane aches and pains that
we all have, in various degrees, at one time or another."37 Doctor Frederick
Wolfe, who played a major role in the development of fibromyalgia as a
distinct disorder, now rejects it as "the emperor's new clothes," and
believes that "we are creating an illness rather than curing one." 38
The subjective nature of diagnosing fibromyalgia is frequently singled
out as a source of skepticism. Andrew Malleson describes fibromyalgia's
emergence as "providential" for rheumatologists, whose diagnoses he
believes are just as subjective as the self-reported pain by patients:
The presence of tender points is far from being an objective sign
of disease, however. The examiner has to use subjective
judgment as to how hard to press, and the patient has to evaluate
subjectively when the pressure becomes painful. Attempts have
been made to replace the examiner's finger or thumb with a
dolorimeter (an instrument adapted from the one used by the Egg
Marketing Board to test the fragility of egg shells by delivering a
measured amount of pressure), but they have been
unsuccessful.... The fact that an objective dolorimeter performs
less well than an examiner's finger seems to illustrate the degree
to which a rheumatologist's subjectivity is involved in the
detection of tender points. There is no reason to suppose that a
patient's subjectivity is any less involved.39
Focusing on the patients, Edward Shorter described a story on
fibromyalgia in The New York Times that included a chart of tender points
as providing "a virtual roadmap for the unconscious," concluding that
"[t]housands of readers must have been suggested into coalescing their
inchoate bodily symptoms into fibromyalgia as a result of this story."40
Regardless of this continuing doubt as to the legitimacy of the disease
itself as well as the diagnosis of fibromyalgia, the Social Security
Administration has recognized it as a "real" disorder that can be the basis,
if properly supported, for a claim of disability.41 Part II follows the path of
37. MALLESON, supra note 29, at 178.
38. Groopman, supra note 5, at 78.
39. MALLESON, supra note 29, at 167-68.
40. SHORTER, supra note 21, at 316; see also Kristin Barker, Self-Help Literature and
the Making of an Illness Identity: The Case of Fibromyalgia, 49 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 279
(2002).
41. Social Security Administration, Memorandum, Fibromyalgia, Chronic Fatigue
Vol. 2 1:192
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a fibromyalgia claimant through the Social Security evaluation process.
II. THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S RELIANCE ON
PHYSICIANS
There are two programs administered by the Social Security
Administration. The older program, begun in 1935, is the Old Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits Program (OASDI). 42  The
second is the Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI).43 OASDI is
more analogous to an insurance program, in that potential recipients must
have paid taxes into the program in order to be eligible, and benefits are
tied to a recipient's previous income." In contrast, SSI disability benefits
are need-based, and benefits are not contingent on a past work history.45 A
recent analysis of the demographics of the two programs found that OASDI
recipients are 68% male, while recipients of SSI are skewed almost exactly
to the opposite gender; 69% female.46 Both programs provide disability
insurance, and both use the same standards to ascertain disability. These
standards, as this Part will outline, rely heavily on clinical medical
evidence and the judgments of physicians-evidence that, as the next Part
will discuss, presents particular problems for women.
A. The History ofDelegation to Physicians
When Congress began to consider a long-term disability insurance
program, some programs already existed to support disabled workers. All,
however, were specific to types of jobs, such as veterans, railroad workers,
the civil service, or disability protections in collective bargaining
contracts.47 The disputes regarding a broader disability program, therefore,
were not focused on the proposed existence of the program so much as its
implementation. As Deborah A. Stone points out in The Disabled State,
because disability was already recognized as an "administrative category of
entitlement" in some circumstances, the key controversy "centered on the
Syndrome, Objective Medical Evidence Requirements for Disability Adjudication 1 (May
11, 1998).
42. Peter V. Lee, Sheri Porath & Joan E. Schaffner, Engendering Social Security
Disability Determinations: The Path of a Woman Claimant, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1477, 1483
(1994).
43. Id. at 1482.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1483.
46. Id. at 1483-84. This disparity is likely due to the varying rates of participation in
the workforce by gender.
47. DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 69 (1984).
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definition of disability and the process of disability certification."4 8
The two biggest hurdles for a broad insurance program based on
disability were the administrative feasibility of determining disability
claims and the cost of such a program. 4 9 From the beginning of debate
about disability insurance, policymakers latched onto the idea of medically
objective determination of disability as a way of constraining both the
administrative and overall costs.5o An Advisory Council report, for
example, described reliance on "objective" medical judgments as a way to
forestall "the problems involved in the adjudication of claims based on
purely subjective symptoms." 5' By restricting disability compensation to
those disabilities "which can be objectively determined by medical
examination or tests.... [t]he danger of malingering which might be
involved in connection with such [subjective] claims would... be
avoided." 52
When Congress debated the creation of Social Security disability
insurance, supporters of a broad disability insurance program stressed the
supposedly objective determination of disability made by physicians.53
Congress had previously relied upon medical determinations in 1954, when
it instituted a "disability freeze" for potential OASDI recipients.5 4 Under
the disability freeze, a worker who became disabled to the point that he was
unable to continue working had his employment status "frozen," so that
years later he would still be deemed eligible for OASDI retirement benefits
even though he had spent some period of time since the onset of his
disability not working.55 Congress had created a panel of medical experts
to draft a set of clinical guidelines establishing how to assess claims of
eligibility for the disability freeze.56
Faced with the prospect of a program in which benefits would be
triggered by disability status, Congress again wanted to delegate the
definition of disability to doctors. Presented with the suggestion,
physicians testified before Congress that such determinations would not be
as easy as politicians believed. For example, a representative from the
48. Id.
49. Id. at 71-72.
50. Id. at 111.
51. COMM. ON IMPROVING THE DISABILITY DECISION PROCESS, BD. ON MILITARY &
VETERANS HEALTH, IMPROVING THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY DECISION PROCESS 73,
(John D. Stobo et at. eds., 2007).
52. Id. at 79; see also Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 621, 629 (1999).
53. Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social
Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361, 408 (1996).
54. Frank S. Bloch, Medical Proof Social Policy, and Social Security's Medically





American Medical Association testified that "[t]he medical profession is
concerned that they may be placed in the role of a policeman... the vast
majority of the medical profession feel that the determination of disability
is hazardous and difficult."57 Indeed, the majority of physicians who spoke
to Congress "attempted to persuade Congressmen that physicians could not
possibly provide the kind of objective determination desired by program
advocates."
Nonetheless, multiple members of Congress spoke confidently of the
ease with which doctors could sort through disabled and non-disabled
claimants. Senator Walter F. George of Georgia argued,
[M]any American doctors are afraid that they cannot determine
when a man or a woman is disabled, when the plain requirement
is that the disability must be a medically determined physical or
mental impairment. Doctors have less confidence in themselves
than I have.... I think more of the medical profession in this
country than to believe that they cannot determine when a man or
a woman worker has a permanent and total disability.5 9
Similarly, Senator Albert Gore, Sr. invoked private insurance policies
as well as other civil service retirement programs that determined disability
by medical evaluation, and pointedly argued that because Members of
Congress themselves were covered by programs that utilized the "accepted
practice" of determining disability by medical evaluation, it was not "a
sufficient answer to question the efficacy of medical determination."6 0
In keeping with this faith, the legislation enacted in 1956 emphasized
a clinical determination of impairment.6 1 From the very creation of the
Social Security disability insurance program, therefore, belief in the
feasibility and integrity of the program rested upon "faith in the techniques
of medical examination and the powers of clinical judgment." 62 From the
outset, clinical and "objective" tests were seen as the reliable antidote to
purely subjective complaints brought by malingerers or fraudulent
opportunists.
57. 102 CONG. REC. 13,046 (1956) (alterations in original).
58. STONE, supra note 47, at 80.
59. 102 CONG. REc.13,038 (1956). Ironically, later in the debate Senator Long,
responding to "the argument that the medical profession could not determine disability,"
listed the most common causes of disability according to government statistics as
arteriosclerosis, vascular lesions of the central nervous system, pulmonary tuberculosis,
hypertension, and then "the only one as to which the medical profession might possibly
have some difficulty in determining disability-rheumatoid arthritis." 102 CONG. REC.
13,039 (1956).
60. 102 CONG. REc. 13,052 (1956) (noting the second objection as the fear of free
riders).
61. Crossley, supra note 52, at 629.
62. STONE, supra note 47, at 83.
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B. The Social Security Administration's Sequential Evaluation of
Disability
Under federal law, "[a]n individual shall not be considered to be under
a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the
,,63
existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may require.
Subjective reports of symptoms are not, taken alone, sufficient to show
disability. As Part III explains further, "there must be medical signs and
findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory
diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment
that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities." 64
In assessing a claim for disability benefits, the Social Security
Administration conducts a sequential five-step process.65 First, a claimant
must have been unable to perform substantial gainful activity for at least
66
one year. The SSA defines substantial work activity as "work activity
that involves doing significant physical or mental activities," and gainful
work activity as work activity "that you do for pay or profit." 67 If a
claimant is employed, federal regulations specify a monthly average
income above which employment is automatically deemed substantial
gainful activity. 68
Second, the SSA evaluates whether a claimant's impairment (or each
impairment, if a claimant alleges that she has more than one impairment) is
severe.69 In order to be severe, an impairment must "significantly limit [a
claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities."00 If an
impairment is not severe, it may nonetheless be considered part of the
claimant's overall medical condition in later steps in the evaluation, but a
63. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (2000).
64. Id.
65. 20 C.F.R. § 404.905(a)(1) (2011).
66. Id
67. Id § 416.972(a), (b).
68. Id § 416.974(b).
69. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(2).
70. Id. § 416.920(c) (2011). Note that this is different than the ADA's definition of
disability, which requires a claimant to show that the alleged physical or mental impairment
causes substantial limitation of a major life activity. Inman & Inman, supra note 17, at 45-
49 (assessing in detail fibromyalgia litigants' treatment under the ADA definition of
disability). The "limitation of a major life activity" showing required by the ADA definition
of disability is even harder for fibromyalgia patients to demonstrate, as the limitations they
face are often related to duration of activities rather than to individual activities being
prohibited entirely. Id. For further comparison between the treatment of disability in the
ADA and Social Security, see generally Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The
Tensions Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit
Programs, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1003 (1998).
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non-severe impairment is by definition non-disabling taken alone."
Third, the SSA consults a regulatory Listing of Impairments.72 This
Listing began as a set of guidelines developed by a panel of physicians
intended to provide another physician-generated "objective" measure of
disability.73  If a claimant's severe impairment appears on the list, or is
equivalent to an impairment on the list, then the claimant is presumptively
found to be disabled and the SSA's evaluation ends.74 If, however, the
impairment is not on the list, then the SSA proceeds with the final two
steps of evaluation.7
The fourth step is to determine a claimant's residual functional
capacity (RFC). A claimant's RFC is what ability a claimant has in a
work setting despite the physical or mental limitations due to her
impairments. 7 7  The SSA will consider both severe and non-severe
impairments in determining a claimant's RFC, and will consider both
medical and nonmedical evidence such as testimony from the claimant or
observations from people close to her-although, as described below, the
weight given to such evidence varies. 8
Finally, having determined what work activities the claimant is
capable of, the SSA asks whether there is any work in the national
economy that the claimant can perform.79 The SSA first assesses whether
the claimant can still do any job constituting substantial gainful activity that
she had within the last fifteen years.80 If not, the SSA then asks whether
the claimant can perform any job that "exists in significant numbers in the
national economy."8' There are two ways to answer this question. First,
the SSA has a grid that matches limitations with available jobs.8 2 This
takes into account both the functional limitations-the medical
impairments already assessed to determine the claimant's RFC-and
vocational limitations, meaning the age, education level, and past work
experience of a claimant." For example, jobs are classified as unskilled,
71. 20 C.F.R. § 404.920(c).
72. Id. § 416.920(d).
73. Diller, supra note 53, at 416-17.
74. 20 C.F.R. § 404.920(a)(4)(iii).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
77. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945.
78. Id. § 416.945(a).
79. Id. § 416.920(t).
80. Id. § 416.960(b).
81. Id. § 416.960(c).
82. 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a).
83. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. (2011). As Linda G. Mills pointed out, the more
transferable skills a claimant has, the more likely that jobs can be found in the national
economy that they can perform, and thus the less likely they are to be found to be disabled.
In other words, people who have no work history at all (often homemakers) or people whose
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semi-skilled, or skilled, in order to be able to label categories of jobs that a
claimant can perform. 84 If the claimant's RFC can be matched to the grid,
the SSA evaluator can either confirm that no jobs exist that she can perform
or point to a list of jobs that she should be able to do.85 If the claimant's
RFC does not fit into the grid, however, then the SSA can call upon a
vocational expert. 86 The grid focuses on physical or exertional limitations,
so if a claimant has nonexertional limitations, a combination of exertional
and nonexertional limitations, or her abilities do not fall within a
predetermined skill level, a vocational expert will often be called to assess
jobs that might be available to the claimant. Only if the SSA determines
that there are no jobs that the claimant is capable of performing will the
claimant be awarded disability benefits.87
The first decision regarding the application is made by the Disability
Determination Service (DDS), generally a state disability examiner and a
state medical and/or psychological consultant, who review the specific
medical claims. The first evaluation is conducted solely on paper-the
DDS examiner and consultant review the application and relevant records
sent in and make a determination on the records alone. The DDS examiner
may, if she believes it necessary, require the claimant to be evaluated by a
consulting physician-but again, all the examiner will eventually see is a
report prepared by the consultant.88
If a claimant's application is denied, she has three levels of
administrative review available to her. First, she can request a de novo
reconsideration of her application by the relevant DDS.89 At that point, she
may submit more evidence to supplement her claim.90 Second, she can ask
for a hearing before an agency ALJ.9 Such a hearing is the first time that
the claimant will have an opportunity to testify on her own behalf.92 She
may also call upon other witnesses to testify.93 Furthermore, the ALJ has a
statutory duty to develop a full and fair record of the claimant's
condition. 94 Thus, the ALJ asks the claimant questions, and can request
job-related skills are purely physical (often men with strenuous jobs) are the least likely to
have transferable skills. Mills, supra note 8, at 221.
84. 20 C.F.R. § 416.968.
85. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 200.00(a).
86. Rawlings v. Astrue, 318 Fed. App'x 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2009).
87. 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a).
88. Mills, supra note 8, at 215.
89. 20 C.F.R. § 404.913 (1992); Mills, supra note 8, at 215-16.
90. Mills, supra note 8, at 216.
91. 20 C.F.R. § 404.929 (1992).
92. Anthony Taibi, Politics and Due Process: The Rhetoric ofSocial Security Disability
Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 913, 925 (1990).
93. 20 C.F.R. 404.950 (2010).
94. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(b)(1) (2010).
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that the claimant provide more documentary evidence. 95 The facts entered
into the record before the ALJ form the record for all future appeals. 96
Finally, the ALJ also assesses the claimant's credibility; particularly
important if subjective reports of symptoms make up a significant part of
her disability claim.
Finally, if the ALJ affirms denial of benefits, the claimant may appeal
to the SSA's Appeals Council. 97 The Council will only review the case on
appeal in limited circumstances: if the ALJ abused her discretion, if the
ALJ made an error of law in evaluating the claim, if the AL's findings
were not supported by substantial evidence, or if there is a "broad policy or
procedural issue that may affect the general public interest." 98
Additionally, the Appeals Council initiates its own review of cases
"through random and selective sampling techniques," 99 and will accept
cases remanded by federal courts. 00
A few salient points may thus be gleaned from the path of a Social
Security claim. First, in the case of a condition that is not per se disabling,
the level of a claimant's symptoms is immensely important. In other
words, if the claimant's impairments do not meet or equal a listed
impairment, she will only be found disabled if her residual functional
capacity is so low that there is no work in the national economy that she
can perform. Her RFC, in turn, will be determined by which and how
much of her reported symptoms are credited by the evaluator. Second, it
takes several steps of review before a claimant ever meets the evaluator
assessing her application. Instead, the SSA evaluator weighs the opinions
of several physicians in deciding on a claim. Even the claimant's
statements about the history of her illness are seen through her treating
physician's notes. As a result, the opinions and records of physicians as to
a claimant's self-reported symptoms are near-determinative of her
disability status.
C. The Reliance on Clinical Medical Evidence
Evaluation of a claimant's medical conditions takes place at several
95. 20 C.F.R. § 404.929 ("The administrative law judge who conducts the hearing may
ask you questions."); id § 404.944 ("The administrative law judge may stop the hearing
temporarily and continue it at a later date if he or she believes that there is material evidence
missing at the hearing."). See Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Lisa B. Proszek, Interaction Dynamics in
Federal Administrative Decision Making: The Role of the Inquisitorial Judge and the
Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293 (1997).
96. Lee et al, supra note 42, at 1503.
97. Id. at 1485.
98. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1470.
99. Id. § 416.1469.
100. Id. § 416.1483.
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points within the process outlined above. No matter when assessment of
medical evidence or a claimant's health takes place within the process,
there are common threads of reliance on clinical judgment.
The focus on clinical evidence rather than symptoms is grounded in
the Social Security Act itself: a qualifying impairment must, by law,
"result[] from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities
which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques."'10
In federal regulations, the SSA states that it will consider all of a
claimant's symptoms, including pain, "and the extent to which your
symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective
medical evidence." 0 2 Regulations go on, however, to make clear that
symptoms alone cannot show disability:
However, statements about your pain or other symptoms will not
alone establish that you are disabled; there must be medical signs
and laboratory findings which show that you have a medical
impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce
the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered
with all of the other evidence (including statements about the
intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms which
may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs
and laboratory findings), would lead to a conclusion that you are
disabled.'o3
Regulations reiterate this focus on clinical evidence with reference to
specific points in the five-step evaluation process. For example, when the
SSA evaluates the severity of a claimant's alleged impairments, regulations
echo the statutory requirement that any impairment result from
"abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques." 0 4
The SSA also creates a clear hierarchy of whose opinion is accorded
more weight, with certain kinds of medical professionals granted more
deference. Regulations specify a category of "acceptable medical sources,"
which are listed as licensed physicians, psychologists, optometrists ("for
purposes of establishing visual disorders only"), podiatrists ("for purposes
of establishing impairments of the foot... only"); and qualified speech-
language pathologists ("for purposes of establishing speech or language
impairments only"). 05 This is in contrast to "other sources," such as
medical sources not listed as "acceptable medical sources" (chiropractors,
101. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3) (2000).
102. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.
103. Id.
104. Id § 416.908.
105. Id § 416.913(a).
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for example) and non-medical sources such as spouses, friends, and
caregivers, who may provide evidence that the SSA will use to assess the
severity of an impairment and how it affects the claimant's ability to work
(but not the existence of the impairment).106
Even within the category of acceptable medical sources, there is a
hierarchy. As regulations explain, "[g]enerally," the SSA gives more
weight to opinions given by a claimant's treating physicians.107 (Similarly,
the SSA gives more weight to the opinion of a physician who has examined
the claimant than to the opinion of a medical source who did not personally
examine the claimant but merely reviewed the claimant's medical
records).'os The treating physician's opinion, however, will only be given
controlling weight if the opinion is "well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence." 09 Regulations further
explain that the more evidence a medical source provides, "particularly
medical signs and laboratory findings," the more weight the source's
-110
opinion will be given.
As a result, information about a claimant's condition is mitigated in
several ways. Her limitations are viewed through the lens of physicians,
either those who have treated her or physicians consulted by the SSA, and
those physicians' opinions are weighed according to their relationship to
her and to the extent that each has grounded his or her opinions clearly in
clinical evidence.
What if, however, fundamental portions of a disability claim cannot be
shown through clinical evidence at all? The next Part deals with this
question by examining the paradigm of this problem: excess pain.
III. OBJECTIVITY, SUBJECTIVITY AND CREDIBILITY IN PROOF
OF EXCESS PAIN
Fibromyalgia is one example of a type of case that historically has
been difficult for the SSA to evaluate. Known as excess pain cases, such
claims are characterized by the alleged disabling condition being a
symptom-pain-rather than simply the existence of an underlying disease
or injury. As discussed above, one problem with excess pain cases is that
the identification of disability was, from the outset, delegated to physicians
who were supposed to be able to ascertain with objective certainty whether
a person was disabled or not.
106. Id. § 416.913(d).
107. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) (2011).
108. Id. § 416.927(d)(1).
109. Id. § 416.927(d)(2).
110. Id. § 416.927(d)(3).
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The inquiry into excess pain, however, is not a single yes/no
identification of pain. By definition, it must also include a judgment of
whether the claimant should or should not be disabled by the identified
amount of pain. In other words, an assessment of disability based on pain
involves two steps: first, assess the level of pain; and second, evaluate
whether that pain is so severe that the claimant is actually incapacitated by
it. An evaluator might find that pain is not disabling not because he
believes no pain exists, but because he concludes that the claimant should
be able to work despite her pain. Judging whether pain is disabling,
therefore, involves a normative judgment of the character of the claimant.
Thus, there are two reasons why an SSA adjudicator might be
skeptical of the excess pain claimant. First, excess pain symptoms might
be seen to be somatic disorders: "pain symptoms are exaggerated or
feigned and, ultimately, within the control of the sufferer."'" Second, as
Lance Liebman argues, "disability as society's categorization of those
honorably disqualified from work"" 2 invites judgment as to a claimant's
fortitude as compared to her suffering:
The claimant alleges that a certain injury is so painful that he
cannot perform any work. The Secretary concludes that, because
similar injuries have not completely disabled other workers,
inability to work is caused by a failure of will, and hence he
labels the disability as nonmedical. When courts review those
cases, their opinions express a social judgment as to whether that
level of pain is a sufficient reason to quit work altogether." 3
The following traces the SSA's reluctance to recognize any excess
pain claims, and the development of a compromise standard by which such
claims are currently evaluated.
A. Before 1984
As discussed above, the Social Security Act created a clear standard
requiring clinical evidence of the existence of an impairment. For the first
two and a half decades of SSI's existence, there was not a clear standard as
to what was required to show the severity of an impairment's symptom-in
other words, how to treat claims that symptoms, such as pain, caused a
claimant's disability.
The SSA issued regulations in 1961 that addressed how to prove
symptoms such as pain, requiring the claimant to prove that the alleged
111. Finch, supra note 19, at 288.
112. Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental
Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REV. 833, 852
(1976).
113. Id. at 852-53.
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symptoms were caused by "structural, physiological or psychological
changes which can be identified by the use of clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques."' 1 4  This standard illustrates the difficulty of
regulating symptoms: it was already clear from the Social Security Act that
a claimant must have some identifiable underlying impairment. The
difficulty for excess pain claims goes one step further: how much
information about the symptom must the claimant prove with objective,
clinical evidence? Is it enough to show the existence of an impairment that
might cause some level of pain, or must the claimant show clinical
evidence of the level of pain she is experiencing? The 1961 regulations
were typical of the early approach: they do not speak to the second question
at all.
As a result, there was a great deal of variety in treatment of very
similar claims. Even after appealing through the SSA into federal courts,
some courts would credit subjective evidence of pain as sufficient to
require a finding of disability."' Two important developments began to
change the field in 1980. First, the SSA issued regulations that said that
symptoms such as pain could be the basis for a disability claim, as long as
claimants could show clinical evidence of an underlying impairment
causing the symptoms." 6 The regulations did not make clear, however,
whether the clinical evidence had to speak to the level of symptom as well.
Second, Congress passed the Social Security Disability Amendments of
1980.117 The Amendments were intended to address the danger of
malingerers; claimants exaggerating their symptoms in the hopes of
receiving benefits."' A main element of the Amendments was to require
"eligibility reviews" of benefit recipients every three years." 9 In practice,
the eligibility reviews resulted in considerable confusion: between 1980
and 1983, half a million people receiving benefits-many of them people
with chronic pain problems-had their benefits terminated at the state
level. Of those who appealed, however, sixty percent had their benefits
reinstated.12 0 Although eligibility reviews had a significant practical effect
on claimants with excess pain, the real significance of the Amendments
114. 26 Fed. Reg. 5572 (1961).
115. Erin Margaret Masson, Note, Social Security Administration Nonacquiescence on
the Standard for Evaluating Pain, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1819,1832-33 (1995).
116. Bloch, supra note 54, at 204-05.
117. Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOCIAL SECURITY
ONLINE (last visited Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html.
118. Id.
119. Margaret C. Rodgers, Comment, Subjective Pain Testimony in Disability
Determination Proceedings: Can Pain Alone Be Disabling? 28 CAL. W. L. REv. 173, 175
(1992).
120. Masson, supra note 115, at 1831 n.90.
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was the ensuing protest.' 21 After the eligibility reviews came under serious
criticism, Congress would eventually pass another set of amendments in
1984 that, for the first time, spoke directly to excess pain.12 2
In the meantime, the SSA issued its first ruling specifically dealing
with pain titled "Evaluation of Symptoms." 2 3 Ruling 82-58, as the First
Circuit would later describe it, "seem[ed] to speak out of both sides of its
mouth" when describing how much objective evidence a claimant had to
present supporting the level of symptoms she alleged. 124
The ruling required that a claimant provide "objective clinical
findings, including clinical data and a well-documented medical history,"
to show both the existence of pain and "the intensity and persistence of
pain and its effect on the claimant's ability to work." 2 5 As the Eighth
Circuit later described, the SSA subsequently "conceded" that "some
adjudicators may have misinterpreted" SSR 82-58 to reject disability
claims based on pain because they were unable to provide objective clinical
findings that "fully corroborated" their claim.12 6 On the one hand, the
ruling acknowledged that "[s]ymptoms can sometimes suggest a greater
severity of impairment than is demonstrated by objective medical findings
alone." 2 7 This implies that the SSA might credit a claimant's reports of
symptoms to support a finding of disability where the clinical evidence
alone would not rise to that level. In other places, however, the ruling
seems to require that a claimant present clinical evidence of the level of
symptoms before those symptoms would be taken into account. For
example, the ruling begins, "Symptoms will not have a significant effect on
a disability determination or decision unless medical signs or findings show
that a medical condition is present that could reasonably be expected to
produce the symptoms which are alleged or reported." 28 Similarly, the
ruling later states that "[c]linical and laboratory data and a well-
documented medical history must establish findings which may reasonably
account for the symptom in a particular impairment." 29 In a section
explaining how to determine the impact of symptoms on a claimant's RFC,
the ruling states that "any additional symptom-related functional limitations
121. See Ellen Smith Pryor, Compensation and the Ineradicable Problems of Pain, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239, 259 (1991).
122. Id at 260.
123. Disability-Evaluation of Subjective Symptoms, Including Pain, Social Security
Ruling 82-58, [Mar.-Feb. Transfer Binder] Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,358 (Oct. 1982)
[hereinafter SSR 82-58].
124. Avery v. Sec. of HHS, 797 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1986).
125. SSR 82-58, supra note 123.
126. Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984).
127. SSR 82-58, supra note 123, at 2.




must largely be inferred from the history and the objective physical
findings... and from medical knowledge as to what symptom-related effects
on functional capacity can be reasonably expected." 30 Relying on the
latter language, the ruling was often interpreted to require that claimant's
produce clinical proof of the severity of their symptoms, and not just the
underlying impairment. 3 1
B. 1984 to 1991
The standard set out in Ruling 82-58 was controversial, and some
courts resisted requiring claimants to prove the intensity of their
symptoms.132 In response, Congress passed a Social Security Disability
Benefits Reform Act in 1984 addressing the question of excess pain
symptoms in an attempt to rein in "a judicial trend allowing 'subjective'
evidence to carry the day in the disability calculus."' 33 Section 3, dealing
with excess pain, read in part:
An individual's statements as to pain or other symptoms shall not
alone be conclusive evidence of disability as defined in this
section; there must be medical signs and findings, established by
medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques,
which show the existence of a medical impairment that results
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities
which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all evidence
required to be furnished under this paragraph (including
statements of the individual or his physician as to the intensity
and persistence of such pain or other symptoms which may
reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and
findings), would lead to a conclusion that the individual is under
a disability. Objective medical evidence of pain or other
symptoms established by medically acceptable clinical or
laboratory techniques (for example, deteriorating nerve or muscle
tissue) must be considered in reaching a conclusion as to whether
the individual is under a disability. 134
This standard was explicitly a temporary measure, set to expire at the
end of 1986.'3 The Act directed the creation of a commission on pain to
130. Id. at 2.
131. Bloch, supra note 54, at 205.
132. Masson, supra note 115, at 1833.
133. Pryor, supra note 121, at 265-66.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 423(4)(A).
135. Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-460, §
3(b)(6), 98 Stat. 1794, 1800.
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help create a permanent standard before the 1984 standard expired. 3 6
The temporary language, however, did not clarify the standard for all
evaluators.'3 7  Courts were not in agreement about whether the Act
reiterated the existing standard as articulated by the SSA, or whether it
changed the standard.'38
Furthermore, the SSA had just begun a protracted battle with the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals over how the Circuit dealt with excess
pain claims. A class action had been brought in North Carolina against the
SSA, alleging among other things that SSR 82-58 was in conflict with a
1980 Fourth Circuit decision holding that the impact of pain on a
claimant's ability to work should be considered even if the level of pain
was shown only by subjective evidence.' 3 9 The Fourth Circuit required
medical evidence to show existence of an impairment that could reasonably
be expected to produce pain, but did not require any medical evidence as to
the severity of the pain, and thus would credit a credible claimant's
subjective testimony alone.14 0 By contrast, the SSA continued to require
clinical evidence of both the existence and the severity of pain.141 The
plaintiffs in the litigation repeatedly won reversals in their favor from the
Fourth Circuit, but the SSA engaged in protracted court battles against the
judgments. 142
Although the Commission on the Evaluation of Pain issued a report in
June 1986, it did not propose a standard for evaluating excess pain claims,
and the Reform Act's standard expired without replacement on January 1,
1987.14 In 1988, the SSA issued ruling 88-13, at least partially in response
to the Fourth Circuit conflicts. 144 The language of the ruling was not as
strict as SSR 82-58, and arguably could allow some amount of reliance on
a claimant's testimony as to her symptoms:
[R]easonable conclusions as to any limitations on the individual's
ability to do basic work activities can be derived from the
consideration of other information in conjunction with medical
evidence. This is consistent with court decisions which require
that statements of the claimant or his/her physician as to the
136. Id.
137. Masson, supra note 115, at 1831-32.
138. John C. Dubin, Poverty, Pain, and Precedent: The Fifth Circuit's Social Security
Jurisprudence, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 81, 118 (1993).
139. Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 983 (4th Cir. 1980).
140. Id at 983.
141. Masson, supra note 115, at 1819-20.
142. See generally id.
143. Dubin, supra note 138, at 125.
144. Disability--Standards for Evaluating Subjective Complaints of Pain and Other
Symptoms, Social Security Ruling 88-13, [July-Dec. Transfer Binder] Unempl. Ins. Rep.
(CCH) 14,118A (July 20, 1988) [hereinafter SSR 88-13].
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intensity and persistence of pain or other symptoms which may
reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and
laboratory findings are to be included in the evidence to be
considered in making a disability determination. 145
In the statement of purpose, however, the ruling stated that it was
intended to "reiterate our policy on the evaluation of pain and other
symptoms."l 4 6 The Fourth Circuit interpreted "reiterate" to mean that the
SSA used SSR 88-13 to "express[] adherence" 47 to SSR 82-58, which by
that time had been invalidated, at least within the Fourth Circuit. 148 Other
circuits similarly resisted pushes by the SSA to require clinical proof of the
severity of symptoms, to the point that by 1991, only the Seventh Circuit
was denying claims merely for lack of objective medical evidence
demonstrating the severity of pain.14 9 Meanwhile, the SSA continued to
nonacquiesce in the court decisions attempting to apply a different standard
of evaluation for excess pain claims,15 0 explaining that it did "not believe
that a Federal agency is constitutionally precluded from relitigating an
issue within a circuit that has previously issued a ruling adverse to the
Government's position."' 5'
C. 1991 to the Present
As an attempt to deal with the confusion, the SSA promulgated new
rules in 1991.152 The SSA described the new material as "amending our
prior regulations... to include a more detailed description of the policy that
we follow in evaluating symptoms, such as pain.... [T]hese final rules make
no substantive change in our policy." 53  Belying this assertion, the
regulations gave considerably more credence to subjective reports of pain.
The SSA described a two-step process used to evaluate excess pain claims.
First, the claimant was required to establish, "by medical signs and
laboratory findings, the presence of a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain
or other symptoms alleged." 54  Second, "once such an impairment is
established, allegations about the intensity and persistence of pain or other
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Hyatt v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 329, 335 (4th Cir. 1990).
148. Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F.Supp. 985, 1000 (W.D.N.C. 1984).
149. Masson, supra note 115, at 1833.
150. Id. at 1840.
151. Application of Circuit Court Law, 55 Fed. Reg. 1012, 1014 (January 11, 1990).
152. 56 Fed. Reg. 57,928 (November 14, 1991) (codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529
(OASDI), 416.929 (SSI)).
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. Id.
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symptoms must be considered in addition to the medical signs and
laboratory findings in evaluating the impairment and the extent to which it
may affect the individual's capacity for work."' 55 Current regulations still
apply this standard, explaining to claimants that "statements about your
pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled; there
must be medical signs and laboratory findings which show that you have a
medical impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce the
pain or other symptoms alleged." 56
Four years later, the SSA again issued a ruling with the purpose of
"restat[ing] and clarify[ing] the longstanding policies of the [SSA] of
considering allegations of pain." 15 Similarly to the 1991 ruling, Ruling
95-5p stated that "[b]ecause symptoms sometimes suggest a greater
severity of impairment than can be shown by objective medical evidence
alone, careful consideration must be given to any available information
about symptoms."' 58 "[I]n all cases in which pain or other symptoms are
alleged, the determination or decision rationale must contain a thorough
discussion and analysis of the objective medical and the other evidence,
including the individual's complaints of pain or other symptoms and the
adjudicator's personal observations." 59
In 1996, the SSA superseded SSR 95-5p to "clarify when the
evaluation of symptoms, including pain... requires a finding about the
credibility of an individual's statements about pain."' 6 0 Under SSR 96-7p,
a claimant is required to present "medical signs and laboratory findings
demonstrating the existence of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce the
symptoms."' 6 1 The ruling also explains in greater detail how to assess the
credibility of a claimant:
155. Id.
156. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.
157. Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles 11 and XVI: Considering Allegations of Pain and
Other Symptoms in Residual Functioning Capacity and Individualized Functional
Assessments and Explaining Conclusions Reached, Social Security Ruling 95-5p (Oct. 31,
1995).
158. Id.
159. Id. Additionally, as of 1996, if a claimant has a "medically determinable
impairment[] that could reasonably be expected to produce the [reported] symptoms," and
the evaluator finds that symptoms have "more than a minimal effect on an individual's
ability to do basic work activities," the impairment will be deemed severe. See Policy
Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Considering Allegations of Pain and Other
Symptoms in Determining Whether a Medically Determinable Impairment is Severe, Social
Security Ruling 96-3p (July 2, 1996). As described supra, however, a finding of severe
impairment will not result in a finding of disability unless the impairment meets or equals a
listed impairment.
160. Policy Interpretation Rule Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability
Claims: Assessing the Credibility of an Individual's Statements, SSR 96 -7p (July 2, 1996).
16 1. Id
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In determining the credibility of the individual's statements, the
adjudicator must consider the entire case record, including the
objective medical evidence, the individual's own statements
about symptoms, statements and other information provided by
treating or examining physicians or psychologists and other
persons about the symptoms and how they affect the individual,
and any other relevant evidence in the case record. An
individual's statements about the intensity and persistence of pain
or other symptoms or about the effect the symptoms have on his
or her ability to work may not be disregarded solely because they
are not substantiated by objective medical evidence.162
The last sentence makes explicit the SSA's rejection of its previous
position that claimants must present medical evidence proving the severity
of their symptoms. Admittedly, this is a small step-a claimant's
subjective testimony about her pain is only considered in conjunction with
the entire record, including the statements of treating and consulting
physicians, and her self-reported symptoms will never control if she cannot
prove through objective medical proof an underlying impairment that could
reasonably be expected to produce pain. But this standard is the high point
of credence given to reports of symptoms. Furthermore, it might seem that
this standard strikes an ideal balance between concerns for fraudulent
malingerers and genuinely impaired claimants. As Part IV will explain,
however, the existing standard's focus on medical evidence fails to address
gendered issues.
IV. WHY CONSIDERING SUBJECTIVE EVIDENCE FAILS TO
ADDRESS GENDERED PROBLEMS
With the context of how far the SSA has come in its evaluation of
excess pain claims, it might seem that the standard has reached an
appropriate balance, and simply taking the subjective complaints of
claimants into account is enough to ensure that their individual experiences
are not overlooked by a disability claims evaluator. As discussed in Part II,
however, even subjective claims are mitigated through the lens of
physicians. For this reason, it is important to assess whether a claimant's
subjective experiences as related to her physician are transmitted accurately
to the SSA. As this Part will explain, there are several reasons to believe
that women's experiences of pain are distorted by a view through the
medical lens.
Most generally, this is true of all evaluations of pain, regardless of the
gender of the patient. In the context of evaluating whether doctors provide
adequate pain control and relief to patients with chronic pain conditions,
162. Id
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studies indicate that "physicians often do a poor job of evaluating a
patient's level of pain," specifically noting that doctors are less likely to
believe the self-reported level of pain from patients who claim high levels
of pain.16 3 Even before looking at specific causes, therefore, relying upon
physicians as the gatekeepers to verify or approve the credibility of a
claimant's testimony is likely to inaccurately minimize the pain actually
experienced by the claimant.
Physicians also, however, evaluate self-reported pain symptoms with
differing levels of skepticism according to characteristics of the patient.
Research indicates that physicians grant credibility to patient reports of
pain differently depending on the physical attractiveness of the patient, the
patient's gender, age, and ethnicity.164 One commentator concluded that
"this research indicates that a physician's assessment of the pain
experienced by a person claiming disability has a substantial probability of
being innocently inaccurate at best and biased at worst." 6 5
There are several reasons why the peculiar gate-keeping function of
physicians within the Social Security claims process affects women with
fibromyalgia in a particularly salient way. This Part outlines why female
fibromyalgia patients' pain is particularly underestimated in the context of
Social Security evaluations.
A. Gender Differences in Pain
Women's reports of pain are treated with skepticism for a basic,
possibly surprising reason: women experience pain differently than men
do. A series of studies in medical publications indicate that women and
men "appear to experience and respond to pain differently." 166 Anita M.
Unruh performed a survey of studies assessing different types of chronic
pain in men and women for the purpose of assessing variation in how
people experience pain by gender.16 7 Unruh concluded that "[w]omen
report more severe pain, more frequent pain and pain of longer duration
than do men." 68 It is unclear what is responsible for the variation-Unruh
noted that possible explanations include "gender differences in brain
chemistry, metabolism, physical structures, and hormonal variations." 69
For the purposes of this paper, however, understanding why women
163. Crossley, supra note 52, at 692-93.
164. Id. at 693-95.
165. Id
166. Diane E. Hoffman & Anita J. Tarzian, The Girl Who Cried Pain: A Bias Against
Women in the Treatment ofPain, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 13, 13 (2001).
167. Anita M. Unruh, Gender Variations in Clinical Pain Experience, 65 PAIN 123, 124
(1996).
168. Id
169. Id at 156.
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experience pain as a more severe sensation than men do is less important
than simply knowing that the difference in experience exists.
Interestingly, not only is fibromyalgia a predominantly female
syndrome, but the pain of fibromyalgia may also be different for women
than for men. In a small study of women with fibromyalgia, the patients
reported that their pain symptoms fluctuated significantly according to
where each woman was in her menstrual cycle.o Similarly, fibromyalgia
patients asked about their pain symptoms after the fact report greater pain
and other symptoms during pregnancy and immediately postpartum.17 1
The authors of the study concluded that, although it seems unlikely that
hormonal variations explain the existence of chronic pain, they could help
to explain the severity of chronic pain.172
Although some literature on the problems of chronic pain have
acknowledged a gender gap in pain experience,173 it is unclear whether any
physicians involved in the SSA evaluation process have reviewed, or are
even aware of, the evidence suggesting that they should expect female
claimants to report a higher level of pain severity than male claimants.
This is not to say that female claimants reporting severe pain should be
deemed credible where a male claimant would not be. As this Part discuss
furtherbelow, however, female claimants already face gendered credibility
problems within the SSA evaluation, which could be addressed in part by
better awareness on the part of physicians and evaluators that female
claimants could reasonably be expected to report more severe symptoms.
B. Gender Differences in Care
When women go to see a physician-well before they make any
disability claim-they receive a different and worse experience of
healthcare than men do in several measurable ways. This inequality is then
replicated in the Social Security evaluation, as their treating physicians
provide medical evidence supplementing the review performed by SSA
consultants.
One reason that women receive a different level of care is due to
structural problems in medical research. When medical research is
performed, it overwhelmingly uses male research subjects. 174 As a result,
the understanding of specific conditions, how well treatment works, the
170. McBeth, supra note 18, at 21 (noting that in a clinic-based study of sixteen patients,




173. Finch, supra note 19, at 289 nn.23-24.
174. Lee et al., supra note 42, at 1489.
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possible side effects of different treatments, etc., assumes a male patient. If
women's experiences are different in an important way-for example, as
described above, if women report more pain than men do-their reaction is
subsequently understood to be abnormal.
Possibly because women's pain is consistently underestimated,
women are consistently judged by physicians to be less credible than
men. 75 A review of the biological studies of pain perception of men and
women concluded that "[w]omen are more likely to seek treatment for
chronic pain, but are also more likely to be inadequately treated by health-
care providers, who, at least initially, discount women's verbal pain reports
and attribute more import to biological pain contributors than emotional or
psychological pain contributors." 7 6 Physicians tend to treat women less
aggressively than men.17 7 When women report pain, they are most often
given sedatives as treatment, whereas men are more likely to be given pain
medication. 178
The review of studies of pain reported an intriguing theory as to why
women are more likely to receive less aggressive treatment:
A recent prospective study of patients with chest pain found that
women were less likely than men to be admitted to the hospital.
Of those hospitalized, women were just as likely to receive a
stress test as men, but of those not hospitalized, women were less
likely to have received a stress test at a one month follow-up
appointment. The authors attributed the differences in treatment
to the "Yentl Syndrome," i.e., women are more likely to be
treated less aggressively in their initial encounters with the
health-care system until they "prove that they are as sick as male
patients." Once they are perceived to be as ill as similarly
situated males, they are likely to be treated similarly. 179
This theory is particularly problematic for fibromyalgia patients. At a
certain point, a woman with heart disease can "prove" that she is as sick as
a man with heart disease. But fibromyalgia is overwhelmingly a female
disease. 80 If there are so few similarly situated males with fibromyalgia-
to the point that fibromyalgia is seen as intrinsically gendered-it seems
impossible that a woman with fibromyalgia could ever be perceived as
being as sick as a man.
175. Id. at 1505.
176. Hoffman & Tarzian, supra note 166, at 13.
177. Mills, supra note 8, at 219-20.
178. Hoffman & Tarzian, supra note 166, at 13.
179. Id at 17.
180. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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C. Gender Differences in Credibility-Damaging Evidence
There are generally two ways to measure pain. First, a patient reports
his or her subjective levels of pain.' 8 ' Second, observers can evaluate the
"pain behaviors or the behavioral-functional abilities" of the patient.' 8 2
In disagreements between claimants seeking disability benefits and the
SSA, it is the second type of measurement that is used to attack a
claimant's credibility. For example, if a claimant argues that she is
incapable of working full-time, the ALJ evaluating her case might point to
the fact that her sister reports weekly visits from the claimant, or that the
claimant is capable of doing laundry and cooking for her children. Just as
gender differences in the experience of pain are different, pain behaviors
also vary by gender. Evidence of pain behaviors that damages a claimant's
credibility, and thus reduces a physician's perception of the veracity of her
claimed level of pain, is also gendered.
First, studies show that women cope with pain differently than men
do:
Women are frequently found to develop a greater repertoire of
coping strategies that includes active behavioral and cognitive
coping, avoidance, emotion-focused coping, seeking social
support, relaxation, and distraction, whereas men rely on direct
action, problem-focused coping, talking problems down, denial,
looking at the bright side of life and tension-reducing activities
such as alcohol consumption, smoking and drug abuse." 8 3
Furthermore, when asked to describe their pain, women tend to respond
with information about how pain has affected their personal relationships,
whereas men are more likely to refer to work duties. Thus, men's pain
reports are more likely to be viewed as "an objective reporting of physical
symptoms or functional limitations."' 8 4
Intriguingly, even the point at which women seek medical help may
be influenced by gendered responses to pami. According to one study,
women who were resilient or had a "positive regard for their ability to
handle the problem" were more likely to seek medical help dealing with
181. Pryor, supra note 121, at 249.
182. Id.
183. Unruh, supra note 168, at 149. Studies focusing specifically on how men and
women cope with chronic pain were not in agreement as to whether men and women dealt
with long-term pain in significantly different ways. One study focusing on men and women
with rheumatoid arthritis found that men's and women's coping strategies were similar,
whereas another study focusing on patients with "intractable pain in the neck, shoulder or
back area . . . found that women used more catastrophising, and reported more distress and
general interference of pain in everyday life due to the pain than men." Id. at 149-50.
184. Hoffman & Tarzian, supra note 166, at 16.
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chronic pain.' By contrast, men were more likely to seek healthcare if
they had a "negative attitude about the condition." 18 6 This positive regard,
however, could damage female claimants who are genuinely prevented
from working - their ability to maintain a positive outlook could convince
a physician that the claimant will overcome what is in reality a disabling
condition.
Second, female claimants also face hurdles in disability claims that
arise from societal expectations that women take care of more duties in the
home. Women are generally responsible for household tasks such as
cleaning and cooking even when they live with a male partner.'87 Evidence
that a woman is able to complete tasks such as cooking dinner or shopping
for food can be presented as proof that her claims of debilitating pain are
not credible.'" The SSA is careful to note that it will "generally" not
consider "activities like taking care of yourself, household tasks, hobbies,
therapy, school attendance, club activities, or social programs" to be
disqualifying substantial gainful activity.189 Such activities, however, can
be used as evidence to show that a claimant is capable of full-time
employment.190 Furthermore, vocational experts assessing what jobs a
disability claimant is capable of performing do not take into account
whether a female claimant will also perform a "second shift" of household
tasks.' 9' To the extent that an estimation of a claimant's RFC never takes
such a second shift into effect, the gendered second shift damages the
claims of all female claimants.
In the case of fibromyalgia claimants, however, the second shift not
only affects the RFC determination by showing what physical tasks they
are capable of, but also attacks the underlying disability claim itself.
Because the claim rests almost entirely on the claimant's subjective reports
of pain, a claimant who reserves energy to take care of her children or does
household tasks on occasional days of less severe pain can be deemed not
credible as to all her allegations of pain, rather than narrow statements of
capability such as whether she is physically able to lift a load of laundry.
185. Id
186. Id
187. Katharine K. Baker, The Stories of Marriage, 12 J. L. & FAM. STUDIES 1,23 (2010).
188. Hon. Dorothy W. Nelson, Introduction to the Effects of Gender in the Federal
Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
731, 734 (1994); see also Diller, supra note 53, at 406 (quoting Senator Robert Byrd
speaking in opposition to disability insurance in 1956 due to his concern for a married
woman who "merely wants to stop work and take care of her home").
189. 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(c).
190. See, e.g., Flowers v. Commissioner of Social Security, 441 Fed. Appx. 735, 742
(1 1th Cir. 2011) (agreeing with AL's rejection of physicians' medical opinions based on
claimant's self-reported ability to perform "some yard work and housework, including
washing dishes, making beds, vacuuming, doing laundry and preparing meals").
191. Lee et al, supra note 42, at 1511-12.
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V. EVOLVING A SOLUTION
There are two implications to be drawn from the arguments presented
here. First, there is the question of how to more fairly assess fibromyalgia
claims, given that the gendered nature of the patient base and the difficulty
in proving excess pain claims combine to suggest that such claimants face
an unduly difficult claims process. It seems likely that most people
involved in evaluating disability claims are unaware of gender differentials
in pain experience and coping skills. Decisions written by ALJs and
reviewing courts are devoid of discussions of such gendered aspects of the
disability evaluation process. A better awareness of the existence of
gendered medical issues could arguably begin to equalize the path faced by
male and female claimants with excess pain claims. It seems unlikely,
however, that efforts to increase awareness alone would produce
substantial change, for a few reasons.
First, presenting information about gender differentials in pain as an
addendum to the existing review process tacitly accepts a credibility
problem for female claimants. In other words, bringing medical literature
showing gendered aspects of pain levels and pain coping skills accepts the
view of female claimants with excess pain as less credible than male
claimants, and seeks to fix that problem with the band-aid of an explanation
of why the female claimants seem untrustworthy. To the extent that
overreliance on clinical medical evidence is itself a problem, specific
information to address particular symptoms of that problem does not
address the underlying issue.
Second, the growing field of studies in implicit bias and what it means
for the law indicate that the intersection of gender and disability presents an
especially thorny field. Through the use of the Implicit Association Test
(IAT), researches have shown that the average person has pervasive and
significant prejudices or stereotypes along lines of race, gender, disability,
religion, sexual orientation, and all sorts of other characteristics.192 These
stereotypes exist even in the conscious, self-reported beliefs of
individuals-in other words, a person who claims to view white and black
people as equal often demonstrates a bias for viewing white people as law-
abiding and black people as law-breaking in the IAT.19 3 An ALJ asked to
summarize his views of women and men, therefore, could truthfully
explain his conscious view that women and men are equal and should be
treated equally by the law, and yet at the same time implicitly view women
192. Jerry Kang & Kristin Kane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the
Law, 58 UCLA L. REv. 465,473 (2010).
193. See Dale Larson, Comment, Unconsciously Regarded as Disabled: Implicit Bias
and the Regarded-As Prong of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 56 UCLA L. REv. 451,
473 (2008).
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as less credible than men, more likely to be malingering claimants, or be
less hardworking than men in ways that would make him more skeptical of
a female fibromyalgia claimant. Information alone seems unlikely to
address the magnitude of such deep-seated and unconscious stereotypes.
Third, while female claimants with fibromyalgia are a compelling
population facing difficulties in disability claims, reliance on clinical
medical evidence likely has effects on other populations, both other
demographics and claimants suffering from other conditions that are not
well captured by clinical evidence. Patchwork solutions to each example
of the problem would thus be an imperfect fix to a broader problem.
Therefore, this article instead suggests that the SSA should direct
evaluators to consider-even to ask claimants-whether there are
characteristics about the claimant that might affect how that claimant
experiences or deals with pain. This would provide an opportunity for
claimants to argue, on a case-by-case basis, that their self-reported levels of
pain are not inconsistent with the clinical evidence. A stronger step would
be to question and perhaps reject standards that only credit subjective
reports of symptoms where those reports are not inconsistent with the
medical evidence.
A directed, individualized consideration of each claimant's condition
and the broader context of excess pain claims would be effective in several
ways. Literature discussing implicit bias indicates that repetitive "practice
at negating the stereotypic association" may eventually break down the
unconscious bias.19 4  Repetitive presentation of the larger context of
different pain responses, as well as other gendered aspects of the disability
evaluation process, would both make evaluators more aware of their own
potential gender biases and be reminded of the stereotypes about weak or
lazy women that they should consciously try to avoid.'95
Moreover, claimants would have an opportunity to explain in their
own words areas of their disability claims that currently present problems.
For example, a claimant's ability to perform household tasks or social
activities is often presented as part of her medical record, usually a short
sentence in doctor's notes or in a medical questionnaire. Devoid of context
or explanation, an evaluator sees only that the claimant is physically
capable of certain activities. By placing an affirmative focus on how
individual claimants experience their condition, such a claimant would be
given the opportunity to stress, for example, that a once-weekly coffee at
home with a family member is a coping mechanism rather than a frivolous
leisure activity.
194. See Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the
Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 242 (2005).
195. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of "Affirmative Action," 94 CAL. L. REv. 1063, 1090-91 (2006).
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This recommendation, furthermore, should be part of a larger effort to
more broadly evaluate the disparate impact of reliance on medical evidence
on different groups. The example of fibromyalgia and women prompts a
broader question, as mentioned above, of whether other groups are
similarly disproportionately affected by the SSA's overreliance on medical
evidence. This article has investigated the specific characteristics of one
syndrome that primarily afflicts women, but women are not the only group
to have alleged disproportionately negative treatment by the SSA-they are
not even the only group to have alleged disproportionately negative
treatment in a way that can be partially explained by overreliance on
medical judgment. In 1992, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued
a report identifying racial disparities in disability benefits.' 96  The
Commissioner of the SSA responded by arguing that the GAO's study was
flawed, because
sample studies consistently show that blacks apply for benefits...
with less severe impairments than do whites. When those
individuals with 'not severe' impairments are removed from the
sample, the findings show that blacks with severe impairments
actually receive benefits at a higher rate than whites with severe
impairments. 197
This reasoning assumes that the determination of severe and non-severe
impairments is an objective question that cannot be influenced by racial
factors. As explained above, however, medical determinations and
evaluations of impairment are not objective and are not always neutrally
made across patients of different personal characteristics.
The example of women with fibromyalgia, therefore, is merely a
starting point. Fibromyalgia claims are an example of how overreliance on
medical judgment leads to unintended discrepancies in how claims and
claimants are treated, but are only one example of a problem that likely has
many different applications. It may be that the original concept of a
"worthy" disabled claimant-one with easily recognizable and clinically
quantifiable symptoms-is simply too narrow, and does not encompass the
reality of disabled Americans today.
CONCLUSION
From the outset of the Social Security disability program, Congress set
up an evaluation process that it intended to be entirely neutral and
objective, based on external analyses of a patient's condition by a medical
196. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: RACIAL DIFFERENCE IN
DISABILITY DECISIONS WARRANTS FURTHER INVESTIGATING 2 (Apr. 1992).
197. Id. at 74-75.
2011 1 17
118 Texas Journal of Women and the Law Vol. 21:1
professional. Unfortunately, Congress's faith in the impartiality and
determinacy of medical evidence has required physicians to make medical,
normative, and legal judgments of claimants. As this article has shown, not
all medical conditions can be adequately diagnosed or evaluated by this
rubric, and the reliance on physicians and medical evidence has particularly
negative effects on fibromyalgia claimants.
The disproportionate effects of reliance on medical evidence,
furthermore, are likely not limited to female claimants with fibromyalgia
claims. Clinical evidence and the evaluation of physicians likely also fail
to accurately assess other types of claims and claimants. Fibromyalgia
claims thus serve as just one compelling example illustrating why medical
evidence and deferral to physicians is not the neutral process Congress
intended.
